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Rare earth elements govern today’s high-tech world and are deemed to be essential
for the attainment of sustainable development goals. Since the 1990s, these elements
have been predominantly supplied by one single actor, China. However, due to the
increasing global relevance of their availability, other countries are now encouraged
to enter the market. The objective of this paper is to analyze the strategic interactions
among (potential) suppliers. In particular, we are interested in (1) the optimal timing
for a newcomer (e. g. the U.S.) to enter the market, (2) the incumbent’s (i. e. China’s)
optimal behavior, and (3) the cost-efficiency of cooperative vs. competitive market
relations. By setting up a continuous-time dynamic game model, we show that
(1) the newcomer should postpone the production launch until its rare earth reserves
coincide with those of the incumbent, (2) the incumbent should strive for a late
market entry and therefore keep its monopolistic resource extraction at the lowest
possible level, (3) compared to the payoffs under competition, cooperation leads to
a Pareto improvement when started at an early stage. The findings of our model are
particularly relevant for the rational strategic positioning of the two great powers,
America and China.
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21 Introduction
In December 2017, the U.S. Department of the Interior published a list of “critical”
mineral commodities, that is, minerals that are “essential to the economic and national
security of the United States” and whose “supply chain is vulnerable to disruption”
(Federal Register, 2017). Among the 35 critical minerals that are listed in this executive
order, nearly half correspond to so-called rare earth elements (REEs). Since America
predominantly depends on REEs from China, the country recently announced its plan
to invest in the development of its national production capacities. Through the use of
continuous-time dynamic game models, the present study therefore aims to define the
time at which the production launch should optimally be triggered and to determine
how the incumbent can best defend its current monopolistic position.
1.1 History of rare earth elements
Rare earth elements are a group of 17 chemical elements in the periodic table (Connelly
et al., 2005)1 for which no backstop technology exists.2 Owing to their very special
electrochemical, luminescent, and magnetic properties, these elements are key raw
materials for advanced technologies, used worldwide in crucial fields such as the energy,
military, automotive, or communication sectors (Goodenough et al., 2018). Despite
their many common properties, each REE has its particular characteristics, making
them unsubstitutable between each other, that is, different usages require specific REEs.
For this reason, the ongoing launch and disappearance of products in the technology
market also results in a continuously changing demand for each individual elements.
However, matching the supply of individual REEs with their varying demand is a
big challenge that can lead to significant market imbalances and thus to large price
fluctuations (Schlinkert and van den Boogaart, 2015). This challenge is often referred
to as the “balancing problem” (Neary and Highley, 1984; Binnemans et al., 2013) and
comes from the fact that on the one hand rare earths do not occur in nature as native
1The 15 lanthanides (at. no. 57–71) plus scandium (at. no. 21) and yttrium (at. no. 39).
2Following the definition of Nordhaus et al. (1973), “the backstop technology is a set of processes that
(1) is capable of meeting the demand requirements, and (2) has a virtually infinite resource base”.
3metals but are contained in different concentrations and proportions with other REEs in
certain minerals,3 and on the other hand the individual REEs cannot be mined separately.
Meeting the demand for all REEs therefore induces supply surpluses of some elements.
Although the global demand for rare earths has so far always been met, ensuring their
future availability recently became a central challenge: while the annual difference
between the overall rare earth supply and demand used to be largely positive, it started
decreasing as of 2005 and even became negative in 2010 (Massari and Ruberti, 2013).
A first reason for this most recent challenge is the steeply growing demand for REEs.
More precisely, after their discovery in the 18th century, the demand for rare earth
elements only became significant as of the mid-20th century and has been increasing
ever since (Zhou et al., 2017). To date, as governments and industries worldwide strive
to mitigate the devastating effects of climate change, the demand for green technologies
(for example, electric and hybrid vehicles, wind turbines, solar panels, and rechargeable
batteries) is expected to face tremendous growth over the coming decades (Dudley,
2017). Since the manufacturing of these sustainable products is heavily dependent on
REEs,4 the emergence of this sector is assumed to greatly contribute to the ongoing
increase in the demand for rare earths (Alonso et al., 2012).
A second reason behind the availability challenge is the monopolistic structure of the
rare earth supply market: from World War II until the 1960s, the demand for REEs was
mainly covered by India, Brazil, and South Africa; between the 1960s and the late 1980s,
the United States (U.S.) took over the lead in world production; by the 1990s, after
eliminating its competitors by practicing dumping prices, China became the world’s
largest producer of REEs (Gordon B. Haxel and Orris, 2002) and covered 98% of global
production until 2010 (Chakhmouradian and Wall, 2012). This monopolistic market
situation is, however, not due to the common assumption that REEs are particularly
rare by any geological measure: unlike their name suggests, these elements have an
abundance in the earth’s crust that is comparable to that of copper, lead, nickel, and zinc
(Krishnamurthy and Gupta, 2015). Thus, although China holds most (about one third)
3For example, bastnaesite, monazite, xenotime, or loparite. Note that the concentration and proportion
of the individual elements varies with the type of mineral and the deposit’s geographical location.
4Especially on neodymium and dysprosium (Chu, 2010).
4of the world’s proven rare earth reserves, it is not the only country where these elements
occur (Zhou et al., 2017). What has actually contributed to China’s dominant market
position so far is the lower operational costs in its rare earth industry (unregulated
and unlicensed mines), as well as the environmental risks that are associated with the
mining and processing of these elements, which have prevented other countries from
harvesting their national deposits (Mancheri, 2015).
Despite the growing demand for REEs and the dependency on China’s rare earth
exports are not new phenomena, they were globally ignored until 2010, when China
withheld exports to Japan, resulting in extensive media coverage and market panic.
Indeed, this was not the only time that the country imposed restrictions on its exports
(Mancheri, 2015). While China argues that their export cuts are meant to preserve the
environment and its natural resources (Trujillo, 2015), others believe that they serve the
purpose of encouraging producers that rely on REEs to relocate their facilities to China
(Mancheri, 2015). In 2012, the U.S., the European Union, and Japan therefore officially
filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO), claiming that China’s
export restraints violate WTO rules. Two years later, the WTO Appellate Body ruled in
favor of the prosecutors and concluded that China had broken free trade agreement.
As a consequence, China had to remove its export tariffs and quotas (Trujillo, 2015).
Nevertheless, till today, their exports rely on licenses and remain quite unstable.
This precarious market situation recently triggered certain countries (for example, the
U.S.) to declare REEs as critical to national interests and to contemplate the possibility of
resuming their own end-to-end manufacturing lines (Chu, 2010; Chapman et al.; British
Geological Survey, 2015; Federal Register, 2017).
1.2 Related literature
In the present paper, we analyze the strategic alignment of (potential) suppliers in
the rare earth market, where the incumbent’s monopolistic position is threatened by
another country’s entry plans. More specifically, we aim to define (1) the optimal time
for a newcomer to trigger its resource extraction; (2) the incumbent’s optimal reaction
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better off by immediately putting their resources together and starting to cooperate.
In the existing literature on strategic games in natural resource markets, there exists,
to the best of our knowledge, no work on REEs, let alone on the competition between
two countries for these “critical” resources. With the present study, we try to fill this
gap. So far, it is typical for models in the related literature to consider the existence
and ownership of Nordhaus’ concept of a backstop technology (Nordhaus et al., 1973).
For example, Gilbert et al. (1978) analyze the optimal price strategy of a resource
monopolist who is threatened by the potential entry of competitors that own a backstop
technology. This means that under their setting, the potential competitors do not have
the exhaustibility constraint of the monopoly. In the rare earth market, however, it is
very likely that the newcomer holds smaller initial reserves than the incumbent. In
related work, Gilbert (1978) offers an intertemporal von Stackelberg equilibrium by
setting up a model where one dominant firm determines the price, taking into account
the other firms’ reactions. In this market, all firms supply a homogeneous resource, and
the reserve as well as the costs of the backstop technologies are perfectly known. In a
more recent contribution, Harris et al. (2010) study nonzero-sum Cournot differential
games resulting from resource depletion in a competitive framework. To approximate
the impact of the finite resources on the Cournot market price and production, the
authors introduce, inter alia, a backstop technology that is owned by the suppliers.
Although our model setting relies on the latter literature, due to the non-existence
of a backstop technology for REEs, we do not include this concept in our analysis.
Furthermore, our work is closely related to a series of publications by Stiglitz (1976),
Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1981a), and Dasgupta et al. (1982), in which the authors analyze
the effects of different market structures on the rate of exploitation of an exhaustible
natural resource, respectively on the substitute’s timing of innovation. Finally, we
also follow Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1981b, 1982), who study how uncertainty about
the discovery date of a substitute affects the rate of resource extraction under diverse
market structures. In contrast to their settings, given the rare earth market structure, we
are unable to consider perfectly competitive markets.
6In our work, we set up a continuous-time model with two periods and two players and
search for open-loop strategic Nash equilibria. Similarly to the setting of Loury (1986),
at the beginning of the second period, where the duopolistic competition starts, each
country commits itself irrevocably to a supply strategy that maximizes its discounted
profit in consideration of the other country’s strategy. Working backwards in time, we
then define the monopolistic supply commitment of the incumbent in the first time
period.
Our results show that (1) the incumbent must first shrink its rare earth stock to the same
level as that of the potential new supplier before it becomes profitable for the newcomer
to enter the market; (2) unlike the newcomer, the incumbent does not benefit from an
early entry and is hence most likely to postpone the timing of the entry by adopting a
conservative extraction behavior during its monopolistic market position; and (3) when
the two countries agree to cooperate from the moment of the entry announcement, they
will both be better off.
As concerns the structure of the article, it is split into two main sections: Section 2, which
covers the non-cooperative game, and Section 3, which outlines the cooperative game.
Both sections start with a description of the model set-up, followed by the deviation
of the countries’ rare earth extraction rate, the market price, and the countries’ payoffs.
Section 3 completes the study with a comparison of each country’s non-cooperative
and cooperative revenues. In Section 4, we discuss the topicality of our study. The last
section concludes and presents strategy recommendations.
2 Non-cooperative game
In this section, we give a detailed description of the continuous-time dynamic model
where players are contenders that act selfishly. Beyond that, we illustrate the solutions
to the optimal control problems and draw some initial conclusions.
72.1 The model setting
Consider country C the monopolistic supplier in the rare earth market in a first time
period I = [0, T ∗), where country A announces at time 0 that it will enter the market
and C commits to a supply strategy that cannot be reconsidered or changed, and
where T ∗ is the optimal time for the entry. At time T ∗, which marks the beginning of the
second time period II = [T ∗,+∞), the market changes from a monopolistic structure to
a duopolistic one, and each country chooses a supply path that is the optimal response
to its competitor’s path.
Note that in this game, we focus on open-loop strategic Nash equilibria (OLSNE) and
not on Markovian ones. This modelling choice can be explained as follows: (1) although
Nash equilibria in Markovian strategies are subgame perfect, they are independent of
the initial state of the game. However, in our model, the initial state of the countries’
reserves is essential as it is likely to affect their supply strategies; (2) in order to get
Markovian strategic Nash equilibria, the players must, at any time in the game, know
their competitors’ reaction to a change in the value of the reserves and consider this
information to optimally revise their supply strategies. In the rare earth supply game,
however, it is plausible to assume that market participants are either not willing or not
able to do so, for two reasons. Firstly, when rare earth suppliers commit to a supply
path right at the beginning of the game and stick to that strategy, this leads to a stable
investment environment, which keeps the importing countries from looking for alterna-
tive resources and thus prevents the suppliers’ reserve-value from dropping. Secondly,
Markovian strategies are costly in time and money: not only must analysts observe and
assess the opponents’ strategic behavior before defining the optimal reaction, but the
countries must also be able to quickly adapt their supply paths, which is only possible
under a high efficiency of their logistics and supply chain management; (3) Harris et al.
(2010) proved that if no backstop technology and its ownership are explicitly introduced
in the setting, the application of Markovian strategic Nash equilibria may lead to a
situation where the existence of a solution cannot be guaranteed. The introduction of a
backstop technology is, however, beyond the scope of the present study.
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P (t) = aQα−1(t), α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
where 1
1−α is the price elasticity of demand, a is a positive constant, and where at time t,
the total market supply Q(t) is the sum of A’s supply qA(t) and C’s supply qC(t). It
is also assumed that at time t, the supply of country i ∈ {A,C} equals the amount of
resources that is extracted from its remaining reserves Ri(t) and that RC(0) >> RA(0).
Other than that, we observe that country A will not:
• enter the market at T ∗ = 0. In this case, A’s resource extraction starts at the
beginning of the game. However, based on the findings of Loury (1986) and
Harris et al. (2010), the country with the smallest reserve will be the first to
exhaust its resources—meaning that C can take advantage of its larger reserve.
More specifically, during the period of duopolistic competition, C can increase its
rare earth supply to lower the market price P . This results in a decrease in both
countries’ revenue pii. Then, after the resource exhaustion has forced A to exit
the market, C can compensate for its “losses” in the duopolistic period by again
decreasing its supply to raise the market price P . Manifestly, under this scenario,
the payoff of country A cannot be optimal;
• enter the market at T ∗ = +∞. This means that country A never enters the market,
so that its resources remain of no value. As a result, A’s payoff piA = 0, which is
also not optimal;
• wait to enter the market until country C has exhausted its entire resources in finite
time, that is T ∗ < +∞ and RC(T ∗) = 0. Indeed, if this is the optimal strategy for A,
then there is no reason for C to exhaust its resources first. Instead, C rather stops
its market supply before RC(t) = RA(0), which leads to the failure of A’s strategy.
The above observations lead us to assume that country A starts to supply the market
with REEs at some time T ∗ ∈ (0,+∞), at which time the reserve ofC isRC(T ∗) = R∗C > 0
and the market price is P (T ∗) = P ∗. Based on these assumptions, we will demonstrate
the existence of T ∗ and define its exact value in the following sections.
92.2 Rare earth extraction and market prices under competition
In order to determine the optimal entry condition for country A, we start with the
second period. Here the non-cooperative suppliers’ revenue is
piIIi (R
∗
C , T
∗) = max
qIIi (t)
∫ +∞
T ∗
e−rtP II(QII(t)) qIIi (t) dt,
subject to
∫ +∞
T ∗
qIIi (t) dt ≤ Ri(T ∗) =
 R∗C , for i = CRA(0) given, for i = A , qIIi (t) ≥ 0,
and
R˙i(t) = −qIIi (t) , t ∈ [T ∗,+∞),
where e−rt is a time-preference factor with rate r.
The Lagrangian function of country i is set up as follows:
LIIi
(
qIIi (t), λ
II
i (t), α
II
i
)
= P II(QII(t))qIIi (t)−λIIi (t)qIIi (t)−αIIi
(
Ri(T
∗)−
∫ t
T ∗
qIIi (τ) dτ
)
,
where λIIi (t) is country i’s shadow price at time t ∈ [T ∗,+∞), that is, the change in
its discounted revenue resulting from an extra unit of its remaining reserves Ri(t),
and where αIIi is the static Lagrange multiplier. From the standard first-order condi-
tions (FOCs), we get that the shadow price λIIi (t) grows at interest rate r, which is
compounded continuously:
λIIi (t) = λ
II
i (T
∗)er(t−T
∗), (2)
and this corresponds to the marginal revenue:
∂RV IIi (t)
∂qIIi (t)
= λIIi (t).
Additionally, we find that the derivative of country i’s instantaneous revenue func-
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tion RV IIi (t) = P II(t)qIIi (t) with respect to its optimal supply path qIIi (t) is
λIIi (t) = a
(
QII(t)
)α−1(
1− (1− α)q
II
i (t)
qIIA (t) + q
II
C (t)
)
= αP II(t). (3)
Using Equation (3) allows us to express qIIi (t) as a function that depends in particular
on the second-period’s initial shadow price λIIi (T ∗). To find this price, we consider
that over [T ∗,+∞), each country will entirely exhaust its initial reserves Ri(T ∗) because
from an economical viewpoint, it cannot be optimal to leave some REEs in the deposit
(no market value). Thus, integrating the supply functions qIIi (t) over [T ∗,+∞) yields
λIIA (T
∗) =
R∗C + αRA(0)
RA(0) + αR∗C
λIIC (T
∗), (4)
and
λIIC (T
∗) = aα
(
r
1− α (RA(0) +R
∗
C)
)α−1
. (5)
Then, from Equations (4) and (5), both countries’ optimal choice and the market price
can easily be deduced. The ensuing proposition presents our results.
Proposition 1 Suppose that country A enters the market at time T ∗ ∈ (0,+∞), when the
market price is P (T ∗) = P ∗ and C’s reserve is RC(T ∗) = R∗C > 0. Then, for any t ≥ T ∗, the
second-period OLSNE5 supply of C and A are given, respectively, by
qIIC (t) =
r
1− α R
∗
C e
r(t−T∗)
α−1 , (6)
and
qIIA (t) =
r
1− α RA(0) e
r(t−T∗)
α−1 . (7)
It follows that the OLSNE market price is
P II(t) = a
(
r
1− α (RA(0) +R
∗
C)
)α−1
er(t−T
∗). (8)
The detailed proof of this proposition can be found in the appendix.
5OLSNE stands for open-loop strategic Nash equilibrium.
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The latter proposition shows that the ratio of the two countries’ supply is constant and
determined only by their initial stocks Ri(T ∗):
qIIA (t)
qIIC (t)
=
RA(0)
R∗C
, ∀t ≥ T ∗. (9)
Since the right-hand side (RHS) of Equation (9) is constant over time, so is the left-hand
side (LHS). Furthermore, Equations (6) and (7) show that at time T ∗, the supply of both
countries qIIi (T ∗) depends positively on their initial reserves Ri(T ∗). That is to say that
the smaller the country’s reserve, the less it is willing to extract REEs. This behavior
remains unchanged over time, as the supply is a decreasing function of t. Moreover,
with the market price being a decreasing function of the supply, the opposite effects can
be observed in Equation (8). This equation also gives country C’s trigger reserve R∗C as
a decreasing function of the trigger price P ∗:
R∗C(P
∗) =
1− α
r
(
P ∗
a
) 1
α−1
−RA(0), (10)
so that the later A enters the market, the higher is P ∗ and the lower will be R∗C .
To determine C’s trigger reserve R∗C , we rely on Equation (3) and find that
λA(t) = λC(t). (11)
By combining Equations (2) and (4), Equation (11) is satisfied if and only if R∗C = RA(0).
We can therefore conclude that
Corollary 1 Country A enters the rare earth supply competition at time T ∗, at which time the
market price is P II(T ∗) = P ∗ and C’s reserve is
RC(T
∗) = R∗C = RA(0).
The above analysis mathematically proves the observation that A enters the competition
at some time T ∗ ∈ (0,+∞). Besides that, it shows that country A should hold off its
market entry until C’s supply has shrunk its stock to the same level as that of A. This,
12
however, also implies thatA has no influence on the time of its entry but totally depends
on the monopolist’s extraction behavior. In other words, the quicker country C extracts
its REEs in the first time period, the faster the initial reserves of C andA coincide and the
earlier country A enters the market. For this reason, let us now turn to the monopolistic
supplier and study the impacts of its extraction behavior on the optimal entry timing T ∗.
2.3 Rare earth extraction and market prices under monopoly
This subsection defines the monopolist’s unalterable extraction commitment on the basis
of how the production launch of countryA affectsC’s supply at time T ∗. Actually, it may
be that country C is incapable of changing its supply volume at the moment of A’s entry.
In this case, C’s supply is continuous at T ∗: qIC(T
∗) = qIIC (T
∗). Of course, there can be
many reasons for such volume inflexibility. For instance, one may think of a situation
where C is unable to rapidly adjust the workforce or machinery utilization within its
manufacturing plants, or where inelastic supply and distribution networks complicate
the modification of product procurement and delivery. Either way, whenever A enters
the game, the total offer of REEs will instantly increase, causing the market price to
decrease at T ∗: P I(T ∗) > P II(T ∗). Another possibility is that C perfectly controls the
different processes of its rare earth supply chain, so that the country is capable of
changing its supply at A’s entry. In addition, regardless of whether or not country A
is present in the market, C does not value its remaining reserve any differently. This
entails that C’s shadow price is continuous at T ∗: λIC(T
∗) = λIIC (T
∗). Furthermore,
given the linear dependency between the shadow price and the market price (see
Equation (3)), the market price is also continuous at the newcomer’s entry. For this
to be satisfied, country C must, at T ∗, decrease its offer by the quantity of A’s supply:
qIC(T
∗) − qIIA (T ∗) = qIIC (T ∗). In the following, the two cases will be examined more
closely.
In both cases, the monopolist faces the price function of Equation (1) and chooses a
supply path that maximizes its revenue, which is given by
piIC(RC(0)−R∗C , T ∗) = max
qIC(t)
∫ T ∗
0
e−rtP I(qIC(t)) q
I
C(t) dt,
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subject to ∫ T ∗
0
qIC(t) dt = RC(0)−R∗C , RC(0) given , qIC(t) ≥ 0,
and
R˙C(t) = −qIC(t) , t ∈ [0, T ∗).
By applying similar calculations as in the appendix, we find that at time t ∈ [0, T ∗),
country C’s shadow price is
λIC(t) = λ
I
C(T
∗)er(t−T
∗), (12)
and that its marginal revenue is
∂RV IC(t)
∂qIC(t)
= aα
(
qIC(t)
)α−1
= αP I(t) = λIC(t). (13)
Substituting (12) into (13) and rearranging terms gives C’s first-period supply function:
qIC(t) =
(
λIC(T
∗)
aα
er(t−T
∗)
) 1
α−1
. (14)
From here, we can determine the first-period supply and market price in both cases.
Henceforth, the continuous supply (resp. price) case is denoted by s (resp. p).
Case 1: Continuous supply
In the case where country C’s supply volume is inflexible and thus continuous at the
time of A’s market entry, we get that
λIC,s(T
∗
s ) = aα
(
r
1− α R
∗
C
)α−1
. (15)
Substituting (15) into (14) yields the results of the next proposition.
Proposition 2 If country C is incapable of adjusting its supply when country A enters the
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market at time T ∗s , then for any t ∈ [0, T ∗), the optimal supply path of country C is given by
qIC,s(t) =
r
1− α R
∗
C e
r(t−T∗s )
α−1 , (16)
and the optimal market price is
P Is (t) = a
(
r
1− α R
∗
C
)α−1
er(t−T
∗
s ). (17)
Obviously, the monopolistic supply follows the same functional form as C’s supply in
the second time period (see Equation (6)).
To define the optimal time T ∗s for country A to enter the competition, we take integrals
over [0, T ∗s ) on both sides of the dynamic equation R˙C(t) = −qIC,s(t), which leads to the
proposition below.
Proposition 3 If country C is unable to adapt its supply at A’s market entry, then the entry
happens at time
T ∗s =
1− α
r
ln
(
RC(0)
RA(0)
)
. (18)
Case 2: Continuous price
Whenever country C’s flexible supply allows its shadow price to remain unaffected by
A’s market entry at T ∗p , we get:
λIC,p(T
∗
p ) = λ
II
C (T
∗
p ) = aα
(
r
1− α (RA(0) +R
∗
C)
)α−1
. (19)
Substituting (19) into (14) gives the results of the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If country C has the capacity to change its supply when country A enters the
market at time T ∗p , then for any t ∈ [0, T ∗), the optimal supply path of country C is given by
qIC,p(t) =
r
1− α (RA(0) +R
∗
C) e
r(t−T∗p )
α−1 , (20)
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and the optimal market price is
P Ip (t) = a
(
r
1− α(RA(0) +R
∗
C)
)α−1
er(t−T
∗
p ). (21)
Again, integrating the dynamic equation R˙C(t) = −qIC,p(t) over [0, T ∗p ) on both sides
gives us the optimal time T ∗p for countryA to enter the market. The solution is illustrated
in the subsequent proposition.
Proposition 5 If country C manages to alter its supply at country A’s market entry, then the
entry happens at time
T ∗p =
1− α
r
ln
(
RC(0) +RA(0)
2RA(0)
)
. (22)
Comparing the results of Proposition 3 and 5 leads to the following conclusion:
Corollary 2 If, instead of adjusting its supply, country C keeps its supply unchanged at
country A’s market entry, then the entry takes place at an earlier point in time, that is, T ∗s > T ∗p .
This corollary actually results from the fact that the monopolistic supplier extracts its
REEs faster if the price, instead of the supply, is continuous, that is, qIC,s(t) < q
I
C,p(t).
More specifically, whenever C is unable to adjust its supply, the country keeps its offer at
a moderate level to ensure that the supply growth at A’s entry does not cause a collapse
of the market price, and thus of its stock’s value. On the other hand, if C’s supply is
flexible, the country can more easily balance out market fluctuations and is hence less
cautious with its monopolistic extraction volume. In addition, as a consequence of the
finding that qIC,s(t) < q
I
C,p(t), the market price of the continuous price case is below that
of the continuous supply case, that is, P Is (t) > P Ip (t). This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Remark 1 Since the entry time T ∗ varies with countryC’s first-period supply behavior, we wish
to emphasize that each T ∗ prior to Equation (15) must be interpreted as T ∗θ , where θ = {p, s}.
This remark yields that in the continuous price case, the second-period supply of
both countries is below that of the continuous supply case, that is, qIIi,s(t) > qIIi,p(t).
This is because the same initial reserve Ri(T ∗θ ) is depleted over a longer time period.
Consequently, the opposite is true for the market price, that is, P IIs (t) < P IIp (t). This is
also portrayed in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 – Monopolistic extraction behavior and consequences
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2.4 Financial effects of the incumbent’s reaction to a newcomer’s mar-
ket entry
In this subsection, we extend the above analysis and focus on the revenue of both market
participants. More precisely, we study how country C’s response to A’s market entry
affects their revenues and determine which reaction is most profitable for country i. For
this purpose, i’s revenue is defined in the case of continuous supply (resp. price), in
both time periods.
In the first time period, the revenue of country C is given by
piIC,θ =
∫ T ∗θ
0
e−rtP Iθ (t) q
I
C,θ(t) dt,
where θ = {p, s}. From the findings of Propositions 2 and 3, as well as Corollary 1, it
follows that whenever C decides to keep its supply continuous at T ∗θ , its revenue is
piIC,s = a
(
r
1− α
)α−1
(R∗C)
α
(
e
αrT∗s
1−α − e−rT ∗s
)
= a
(
r
1− αRC(0)
)α−1
(RC(0)−RA(0)) .
(23)
Whereas, on the other hand, when the market entry causes a drop in C’s supply, its
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revenue is
piIC,p = a
(
r
1− α
)α−1
(RA(0) +R
∗
C)
α
(
e
αrT∗p
1−α − e−rT ∗p
)
= a
(
r
1− α(RC(0) +RA(0))
)α−1
(RC(0)−RA(0)).
(24)
Moreover, since C is the monopolistic supplier in this first period, country A’s revenue
is piIA,θ = 0. When comparing the payoffs in Equations (23) and (24), we find that the
first-period revenue of country C is greater in the continuous supply case, that is,
piIC,s > pi
I
C,p ; this seems normal as the later market entry T
∗
s extends the monopolistic
period.
We now turn to the second time period, where country i’s revenue is given by
piIIi,θ =
∫ +∞
T ∗θ
e−rtP IIθ (t) q
II
i,θ(t) dt.
Here, using the findings of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 yields that in the continuous
supply case, both countries’ revenue is
piIIA,s = pi
II
C,s = aRA(0)
(
r
1− α2RC(0)
)α−1
, (25)
and that in the continuous price case, their revenue is
piIIA,p = pi
II
C,p = aRA(0)
(
r
1− α (RC(0) +RA(0))
)α−1
. (26)
This time, the second-period revenue of Equation (25), discounted to the present value,
is below that of Equation (26), that is, piIIi,s e−rT
∗
s < piIIi,p e
−rT ∗p . As a result, country A will
be better off if the monopolistic supplier exploits its reserves rapidly, so that its entry is
shifted further forward. For country C however, its entry-reactions have opposite effects
on its first- and second-period revenue. That is why C’s best reaction is determined
through the aggregated revenue, which is given by
ΠC,θ = pi
I
C,θ + pi
II
C,θ e
−rT ∗θ . (27)
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Based on Equation (27), we find that the monopolistic supplier’s aggregated revenue
is greater in the continuous supply case, that is, ΠC,s > ΠC,p. Accordingly, even when
C’s supply volume is flexible, the country has no financial incentive to adjust its supply
at T ∗θ but should rather supply the market with just enough REEs to avoid the price
reaching a level at which a backstop technology could appear. The above analysis is
aggregated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose that A’s optimal entry time is T ∗θ , where θ = {p, s}. Then
(1) piIC,s > piIC,p ;
(2) piIIA,θ = piIIC,θ ;
(3) piIIi,s e−rT
∗
s < piIIi,p e
−rT ∗p , i = {A,C} ;
(4) ΠC,s > ΠC,p , ΠA,s < ΠA,p , with ΠA,θ = piIIA,θ e−rT
∗
θ .
In other words, countryC keeps its supply continuous at the market entry, and therefore,
the non-cooperative game is suboptimal for country A. To analyze whether or not
cooperation leads to a Pareto improvement, in the next section we set up a game where
the countries can cooperate and coordinate their strategies.
3 Cooperative game
Consider a model6 where countries A and C start to cooperate right at the beginning of
the game, and suppose that their cooperation lasts forever. In this case, the time in the
joint period t ∈ [0,+∞), where at time 0 both countries collectively and definitively com-
mit themselves to a joint supply strategy qj(t) that maximizes their joint revenue RV j .
Furthermore, given that no differences in the exploitation or manufacturing processes
of the two countries are considered in the model, their joint revenue RV j is split based
on the share of their initial reserves Ri(0). Apart from that, the price function P j(t)
6We keep the notations of Section 2.
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of this game is identical to that in the non-cooperative game (see Equation (1)). The
cooperative suppliers’ joint revenue is thus given by
RV j = max
qj(t)
∫ +∞
0
e−rtP j(qj(t)) qj(t) dt,
subject to ∫ +∞
0
qj(t) dt = RC(0) +RA(0) = R
j(0) given, qj(t) ≥ 0,
and
R˙j(t) = −qj(t) , t ∈ [0,+∞).
The standard process of solving optimal control problems yields that the shadow price
is
λj(t) = λj(0)ert, (28)
and that the marginal revenue is
∂RV j(t)
∂qj(t)
= aα (qj(t))α−1 = αP j(t) = λj(t). (29)
Moreover, substituting (28) into (29) and rearranging terms leads to the joint supply
function:
qj(t) =
(
λj(0)ert
aα
) 1
α−1
. (30)
Again, if we consider that the joint reserve is completely exploited over [0,+∞), inte-
grating the dynamic equation R˙j(t) = −qj(t) over [0,+∞) gives us the shadow price at
the beginning of the game:
λj(0) = aα
(
r
1− α(RC(0) +RA(0))
)α−1
. (31)
From here, it is enough to substitute (31) into (30) to find the optimal rare earth extraction
and market price in the cooperative game. The results are presented in the ensuing
proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose that countries A and C start their cooperation at the beginning of the
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game, and assume that it lasts forever. Then, the OLSNE joint supply is given by
qj(t) =
r
1− α(RC(0) +RA(0)) e
rt
α−1 , (32)
and the OLSNE market price is
P j(t) = a
(
r
1− α(RC(0) +RA(0))
)α−1
ert. (33)
The results of the last proposition allow us to determine the joint revenue:
RV j = a
(
r
1− α
)α−1
(RC(0) +RA(0))
α. (34)
Based on the countries’ initial stocks, we get from Equation (34) that the revenue of
countries A and C is, respectively,
RV jA =
RA(0)
RA(0) +RC(0)
RV j = a RA(0)
(
r
1− α(RC(0) +RA(0))
)α−1
, (35)
and
RV jC =
RC(0)
RA(0) +RC(0)
RV j = a RC(0)
(
r
1− α(RC(0) +RA(0))
)α−1
. (36)
Now let us compare country i’s cooperative revenue with that of the non-cooperative
game. The following proposition states our findings.
Proposition 8 If the cooperation between both countries starts at the beginning of the game
and lasts forever, then in comparison to the non-cooperative payoffs, the cooperative game leads
to a Pareto improvement:
RV ji > Πi,θ , i = {A,C} , θ = {p, s}.
The latter proposition thus states that both countries receive higher payoffs when, from
the beginning of the game, they choose to not compete with each other. In other words,
country A should enter the market and start to cooperate with C right at its entry
announcement, where t = 0.
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Moreover, note that the set-up of the above model can be changed such that the cooper-
ative game starts at A’s entry time T ∗θ . Similarly to the above setting, the countries’ joint
revenue RV J∗θ will be split based on the share of their initial reserves Ri(T
∗
θ ). However,
with the countries’ reserves being equal at T ∗θ , that is, RA(0) = RC(T
∗
θ ) (see Corollary 1),
it turns out that no differences exist between their cooperative and non-cooperative
revenues, such that RV J∗i,θ = pi
II
i,θ. Therefore, this case will not be developed in more
detail.
4 Discussion
The subject of our study is very topical in light of the importance of REEs in the ongoing
digitalization and energy revolution on the one side, and the dependence on China’s
volatile rare earth exports on the other side, which has led global players like America,
but also Australia and Japan, to make plans to enhance their domestic mining and
processing capabilities.
The most recent and concrete plan, however, comes from the U.S., who despite its great
need for REEs, relies almost entirely on rare earths from China, since the Mountain
Pass Mine in California is currently the only active mine in the country. While this
Californian mine supplied most of the world’s REEs in the 1980s, nowadays it operates
at just a fraction of its potential capacity, and its rare earth compounds are shipped to
China for processing. However, in the context of the ongoing trade battle between the
U.S. and China, America’s ore shipments were saddled with higher tariffs by China.
In addition, a recent visit of the Chinese President to one of the country’s major rare
earth facilities, as well as different Chinese reports of state-controlled entities, raised
concerns about a new potential embargo on exports of REEs to America (Partington,
2019; Hornby and Sanderson, 2019). In light of these growing threats, the U.S. therefore
announced its intention to reduce China’s market power by building, in collaboration
with Australia, a large rare earth separation plant on American soil (Hoyle, 2019).
Nonetheless, with China’s rare earth reserves being much larger than those of the U.S.,
America’s plan to re-enter the market requires careful design. Indeed, if market entry
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happens too early, America’s resources will be exhausted before those of China, and the
country will end up with a definite dependency on rare earth imports. Otherwise, if
the U.S. waits too long, a third party may take advantage of the situation and supply
the market with some backstop technology. Furthermore, from China’s perspective
it is equally important to properly react to America’s entry plan, not only to keep the
importing countries from looking for an alternative supplier, but also to minimize the
economic losses that come with the switch to a duopolistic market structure.
5 Conclusion
The present paper studies the strategic game played by two countries that wish to
position themselves optimally in the rare earth supply market. The first goal of the
study is to determine a potential new supplier’s optimal timing for triggering its national
rare earth extraction. For this purpose, we set up a two-period continuous-time model
and search for open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies. Using backward induction, we
start with the second time period, where at the beginning the newcomer enters the
market and both countries commit once for all to an extraction path that leads to the
best possible payoff, taking into account the other country’s strategy. Thereafter, we
pursue our second objective, which is to determine the incumbent’s optimal supply
commitment in the first time period, where the country still holds a monopolistic
position. Here, the monopolistic supply path is determined under two assumptions:
(1) the incumbent can adapt its supply volume at the moment of the newcomer’s
market entry, and (2) its supply inflexibility does not allow for instantaneous volume
changes. The incumbent’s optimal supply reaction to the newcomer’s launch plan is
then defined by comparing its aggregated revenues in both scenarios. Lastly, we analyze
whether a Pareto improvement occurs when both countries decide to cooperate from
the moment of the entry announcement. In this case, the optimization problem is set up
such that at the beginning of the first period, the countries put their reserves together
and jointly choose an open-loop extraction path that maximizes their joint revenue.
Later on, the competitive and cooperative revenues of each country are compared to
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draw conclusions.
Our findings show that the newcomer’s optimal entry strategy is to hold back its
production launch until its reserves coincide with those of the incumbent. It follows
from this that the incumbent can actually control the entry timing through the speed of
its monopolistic resource extraction: the faster (slower) its exploitation, the earlier (later)
its stock is reduced to the level of the newcomer’s and the entry is triggered. We further
observe that the incumbent’s first-period extraction rate increases with the flexibility of
its supply: the country’s exploitation behavior is more conservative when its supply
volume cannot be adjusted promptly. Besides this, the results show that while the
newcomer would benefit from an early entry, the opposite is more likely to take place
as the incumbent’s aggregated revenue increases with the length of the monopolistic
period. This suggests that under competition, the incumbent should keep its supply
levels unchanged at the moment of the newcomer’s market entry, that is, it should hold
back its resource extraction in the first period. In addition, we see that both countries
could in fact increase their payoffs by choosing to cooperate from the moment the launch
plan is announced. Therefore, unlike under competition, if the incumbent intends to
cooperate, it should not delay the entry too much, otherwise the newcomer could prefer
to forego the financial benefits of the cooperative game to keep the incumbent from
reaching its first best solution.
Future research should focus on reformulating the countries’ strategies to Markovian
ones, in both time periods. In this case, one would assume that the countries do not
forever commit themselves to an extraction path at the beginning of each period, but
that they modify their paths with regard to time and the current value of the rare
earth reserves. Besides this, one could also change the model’s demand function and
empirically determine its parameters. Comparing these results with those of the present
paper then enables to asses, theoretically and numerically, whether or not, for the
situation under study, the different assumptions about the countries’ commitment
approaches and the market demand lead to equivalent conclusions.
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A Appendix
The second-period optimal control problem for both countries is
piIIi (R
∗
C , T
∗) = max
qIIi (t)
∫ +∞
T ∗
e−rtP II(QII(t)) qIIi (t) dt,
subject to
∫ +∞
T ∗
qIIi (t) dt ≤ Ri(T ∗) =
 R∗C , for i = CRA(0) given, for i = A , qIIi (t) ≥ 0,
and
R˙i(t) = −qIIi (t) , t ∈ [T ∗,+∞).
Since the first constraint of the optimization problem is equivalent to
∫ t
T ∗
qIIi (τ) dτ ≤ Ri(T ∗) , t ∈ [T ∗,+∞),
the Lagrangian is set up as follows:
LIIi
(
qIIi (t), λ
II
i (t), α
II
i
)
= P II(QII(t))qIIi (t)−λIIi (t)qIIi (t)−αIIi
(
Ri(T
∗)−
∫ t
T ∗
qIIi (τ) dτ
)
,
where λIIi (t) is the shadow price and αIIi is the static Lagrange multiplier. The standard
first-order conditions (FOCs) are
λ˙IIi (t) = r λ
II
i (t),
∂
∂qIIi (t)
LIIi
(
qIIi (t), λ
II
i (t), α
II
i
)
= ∂
∂qIIi (t)
RV IIi (t)− λIIi (t) + αIIi ∂∂qIIi (t)
∫ t
T ∗ q
II
i (τ) dτ = 0,
αIIi ≥ 0, Ri(T ∗)−
∫ t
T ∗ q
II
i (τ) dτ ≥ 0, αIIi
(
Ri(T
∗)− ∫ t
T ∗ q
II
i (τ) dτ
)
= 0,
where the revenue of country i is RV IIi (t) = P II(t)qIIi (t). Based on the remarks in
point (3) of Subsection 2, it is not optimal for country i to exhaust its resources in finite
time, thus Ri(T ∗) >
∫ t
T ∗ q
II
i (τ) dτ , and hence αIIi = 0.
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The first FOC yields that i’s shadow price λIIi (t) of its remaining reserve Ri(t) grows at
interest rate r, compounded continuously:
λIIi (t) = λ
II
i (T
∗)er(t−T
∗). (37)
The second FOC and the fact that αIIi = 0 show that the shadow price does actually
correspond to the marginal revenue:
∂RV IIi (t)
∂qIIi (t)
= λIIi (t). (38)
Since the revenue of country i is
RV IIi (t) = P
II(t)qIIi (t) = a
(
QII(t)
)α−1
qIIi (t) = a
(
qIIA (t) + q
II
C (t)
)α−1
qIIi (t),
we obtain
∂RV IIi (t)
∂qIIi (t)
= a
(
QII(t)
)α−1(
1− (1− α)q
II
i (t)
qIIA (t) + q
II
C (t)
)
= λIIi (t), (39)
which yields that
1− (1−α)qIIi (t)
qIIA (t)+q
II
C (t)
1− (1−α)qIIj (t)
qIIA (t)+q
II
C (t)
=
λIIi (T
∗)
λIIj (T
∗)
=
λIIi (t)
λIIj (t)
, (40)
where i, j ∈ {A,C} and i 6= j. After rearranging Equation (40), we find
qIIA (t) =
λIIC (T
∗)− αλIIA (T ∗)
λIIA (T
∗)− αλIIC (T ∗)
qIIC (t). (41)
When integrating Equation (41) over [T ∗,+∞) and by assuming that over [T ∗,+∞) the
total REE reserve is exhausted, as from an economical viewpoint it is not optimal to
leave some elements in the deposit (no market value), we get
RA(0)
RC(T ∗)
=
λIIC (T
∗)− αλIIA (T ∗)
λIIA (T
∗)− αλIIC (T ∗)
, (42)
that is,
λIIA (T
∗) =
R∗C + αRA(0)
RA(0) + αR∗C
λIIC (T
∗). (43)
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Equations (41) and (42) yield
qIIA (t)
qIIC (t)
=
RA(0)
RC(T ∗)
, ∀t ≥ T ∗. (44)
Since the price function in Equation (1) is
P II(t) = a
(
qIIA (t) + q
II
C (t)
)α−1
= a
(
RA(0)
R∗C
+ 1
)α−1 (
qIIC (t)
)α−1 (45)
[
resp. P II(t) = a
(
1 +
R∗C
RA(0)
)α−1 (
qIIA (t)
)α−1]
, (46)
the revenue of country C [resp. country A] is
RV IIC (t) = P
II(t)qIIC (t) = a
(
RA(0)
R∗C
+ 1
)α−1
(qIIC (t))
α
[
resp. RV IIA (t) = P
II(t)qIIA (t) = a
(
1 +
R∗C
RA(0)
)α−1
(qIIA (t))
α
]
.
In view of (39), country i’s marginal revenue is
∂RV IIi (t)
∂qIIi (t)
= αP II(t) = λIIi (t). (47)
Equation (47) allows us to define the market price by
P II(t) =
λIIi (t)
α
. (48)
When combining (45) and (47), we get
qIIC (t) =
R∗C
RA(0) +R∗C
(
λIIC (t)
aα
) 1
α−1
=
R∗C
RA(0) +R∗C
(
λIIC (T
∗)
aα
) 1
α−1
e
r(t−T∗)
α−1 . (49)
Integrating Equation (49) over [T ∗,+∞), we obtain
λIIC (T
∗) = aα
(
r
1− α (RA(0) +R
∗
C)
)α−1
. (50)
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Finally, by substituting Equation (50) into Equation (49) [resp. (48)], we find the extrac-
tion rate of country C [resp. duopoly market price of the REE]:
qIIC (t) =
r
1− α R
∗
C e
r(t−T∗)
α−1 (51)
[
resp. P II(t) = a
(
r
1− α (RA(0) +R
∗
C)
)α−1
er(t−T
∗)
]
.
Then, by substituting Equation (51) into Equation (44), we get the extraction rate of
country A:
qIIA (t) =
RA(0)
R∗C
qIIC (t) =
r
1− α RA(0) e
r(t−T∗)
α−1 . (52)
This finishes the proof. The results are presented in Proposition 1 of Section 2.
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